Reply to Lewis: metaphysics versus epistemology by Papineau, David & Durà-Vilà, Víctor
Reply to Lewis: metaphysics versus epistemology 
 
David Papineau & Víctor Durà-Vilà 
 
 
 
Peter J. Lewis (2007) argued that the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics 
implies the unpopular halfer position in the Sleeping Beauty debate. We retorted that 
it is perfectly coherent to be an Everettian and an ordinary thirder (Papineau and 
Durà-Vilà 2009). In a recent reply to our paper Lewis (2009) further clarifies the basis 
for his thinking. We think this brings out nicely where he goes wrong: he 
underestimates the importance of metaphysical considerations in determining rational 
credences.  
 
 Lewis’s original argument hinged on the epistemic parallels between (a) an 
Everettian scenario where the x-spin of an electron in an eigenstate of z-spin is 
measured, with the result hidden from an observer and (b) a simplified Sleeping 
Beauty scenario where Sleeping Beauty is told that she will be woken on Monday and 
on Tuesday, with memory erasure in between. Lewis (2007: 60) pointed out that in 
both cases the agent’s subjective experience has the same branching structure, with 
the agent becoming uncertain about her location therein. He concluded that the agent 
should adopt the same credences in both cases. Given that Everettians are committed 
in the spin case to assigning pre-measurement credences of 1/2 to ‘up’ and ‘down’, 
Lewis infers that the Everettian interpretation implies that Sleeping Beauty should 
similarly assign pre-sleeping credences of 1/2 to waking on Monday and waking on 
Tuesday. But this would of course be very bad for the Everettian interpretation, since 
Sleeping Beauty’s credences here should clearly be 1.  
 
 In essence our retort was that the epistemic parallels between the two cases are 
trumped by their metaphysical differences. Everettians think that reality itself 
branches when quantum events take place. But there is no such metaphysical 
branching in the Sleeping Beauty case. We argued that this warrants a differential 
assignment of credences of 1/2 in the spin case but 1 in the simplified Sleeping 
Beauty case. 
  
 Lewis’s first response is to query the extent of the metaphysical differences:  
 
 If ‘reality’ is that which is described by the underlying physics, then 
there is no branching of reality even in the Everettian case; branching 
(for the contemporary Everettian) is a phenomenon that emerges at the 
macroscopic level via decoherence. That is, in the Everettian case as in 
the (simplified) Sleeping Beauty case, there is a single world in which 
the agent is uncertain of her location. (2009: ??) 
 
We are happy to grant that in one sense there is no branching for Everettians. There is 
no branching at the level of the underlying physics. But in another sense the 
Everettian interpretation clearly does postulate branching. Everettians hold that after 
the measurement decoherence generates a part of reality that behaves like a quasi-
classical world and contains a post-fission agent who sees spin-up, and another part of 
reality that behaves analogously and contains a post-fission agent who sees spin-down. 
From this perspective it is misleading to talk of a ‘single world’ in both the Everettian 
and simplified Sleeping Beauty cases. Where the single world containing Sleeping 
Beauty is metaphysically familiar, the Everettian world is a multiverse containing 
many separate branches of reality resulting from decoherence. 
 
Still, we needn’t fight about the terminology of ‘branching’. For Lewis 
quickly moves onto another tack. He says that he is happy to allow that there are 
genuine metaphysical differences between the two cases. But he then argues that these 
metaphysical differences can’t really matter, given that the two cases are carefully 
constructed to be epistemically parallel. 
 
 This is where we think Lewis goes wrong: he is here assuming that the rational 
assignments of credences can be settled independently of metaphysics. But we see no 
reason for this assumption. After all, on the conventional interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, nobody thinks that the assignment of credences to quantum results is 
independent of metaphysical matters. On the contrary, it is universally agreed that the 
rational strategy is to match your credences to the objective quantum probabilities, in 
line with David Lewis’s (1986: 87) Principal Principle.  
 
Everettians will agree that subjects should match their degrees of belief to the 
objective quantum probabilities. The issue is then where such probabilities are to be 
found. Everettians say that they arise specifically when decoherence yields quasi-
classical branches of reality, and moreover that they are equal to the squared moduli 
of the amplitudes of those branches.   
 
Against this background, it is irrelevant that there are certain experiential 
parallels between simplified Sleeping Beauty and Everettian spin measurements. 
Everettians will simply respond that the Sleeping Beauty scenario does not involve 
the kind of metaphysical structure that gives rise to non-unitary quantum probabilities, 
for lack of any decoherent branching.   
 
Since there is no decoherent branching in the Sleeping Beauty case, the 
objective probabilities of waking on Monday and Tuesday are both 1. In the spin-
measurement case, by contrast, there is branching, with the squared moduli of the 
amplitudes of each branch equal to 1/2. The rational degrees of belief follow suit, in 
line with the Principal Principle. The point is that rational subjective probabilities here 
track objective ones, and the objective probabilities depend on the metaphysical 
structure. Far from being irrelevant, the metaphysical structure is crucial to the 
determination of rational degrees of belief.
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1
 In our earlier paper (2009: §7) we offered Lewis the support of Lev Vaidman’s approach to Everettian 
probability (1998, 2002). Lewis declined this offer, querying our assumption that Vaidman really aims 
to derive pre-fission uncertainty from post-fission subjects’ ignorance about location. We still find it 
hard to read Vaidman any other way. (Consider for instance his claim that the pre-fission agent ‘can 
associate probability for different outcomes according to the ignorance probability of each of his 
descendants’ 1998: 254.) 
2
 We are grateful to Peter J. Lewis, Darren Bradley and Paul Tappenden for discussion of these issues. 
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